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STATEMENT OF IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICUS 
CURIAE 
 
The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality (Korematsu 
Center) is a non-profit organization based at the Seattle University School 
of Law. The Korematsu Center works to advance justice through research, 
advocacy, and education. Inspired by the legacy of Fred Korematsu, who 
defied military orders during World War II that ultimately led to the 
unlawful incarceration of 110,000 Japanese Americans, the Korematsu 
Center works to advance social justice for all. It has a special interest in 
promoting fairness in the courts of our country. That interest includes 
ensuring that effective remedies exist to address implicit and explicit bias 
in the courtroom and in the criminal justice system at large. The 
Korematsu Center does not, in this brief or otherwise, represent the 
official views of Seattle University. 
INTRODUCTION & SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 
Both the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
the more protective Article I, section 14, of Washington’s constitution 
prohibit arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. Yet, a report by 
Professor Katherine Beckett (“Beckett Report”), which compiles and 
analyzes the vast majority of trial court reports filed since implementation 
of the current death penalty statute in 1981, both provides this Court a 
2 
 
basis on which to revisit the constitutionality of Washington’s death 
penalty statute, and demonstrates that the statute has permitted the very 
arbitrariness it should prevent.  
The Beckett Report demonstrates that extra-legal factors such as 
racial bias continue to influence the administration of the death penalty, 
resulting in its disproportionate imposition on Black defendants. Aversive 
racism may negatively affect Black defendants, making them less likely to 
receive discretionary leniency, or mercy. However, an equally compelling 
and important explanation for this racial disproportionality is that in-group 
favoritism may positively affect White defendants, making them more 
likely to receive discretionary leniency.
1
 
 Thus, consistent with the mandate of Furman v. Georgia to ensure 
the death penalty is not imposed on the “constitutionally impermissible 
basis of race,” 408 U.S. 238, 313, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1972) 
(White, J., concurring), an inquiry into possible mechanisms of 
arbitrariness must take into account the role of discretionary leniency—
i.e., a jury’s decision to impose a life sentence in a capital case—as well as 
a jury’s decision to impose death.  
                                                 
1
 Because there is greater familiarity with aversive bias, this brief focuses on in-
group favoritism as an important, and often overlooked, mechanism that produces racial 
disproportionality. 
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The arbitrariness and racial bias that infect capital sentencing not 
only render Washington’s death penalty statute unconstitutional under 
both the Eighth Amendment and under Washington’s more protective 
Article I, section 14, but also demonstrate that Mr. Gregory’s sentence 
must be reversed under the mandatory review procedures of RCW 
10.95.130. The statute requires this Court to reverse a death sentence that 
is disproportionate or based on passion or prejudice. This Court should 
apply its understanding of how bias actually operates to these statutory 
inquiries, and should reverse in light of the great improbability that a 
capital jury can render a verdict free from implicit bias. 
ARGUMENT 
 
I. THE COURT SHOULD TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO 
RECONSIDER WHETHER THE DEATH PENALTY 
STATUTE ADEQUATELY GUARDS AGAINST ITS OWN 
ARBITRARY APPLICATION, AS REQUIRED BY THE 
EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND FURMAN. 
 
In 2006, this Court in State v. Cross, 156 Wn.2d 580, 623, 132 
P.3d 80 (2006), reaffirmed that Washington’s death penalty statute is 
constitutional. However, as Mr. Gregory explains in his reply brief, stare 
decisis does not require adherence to Cross because, today, the evidentiary 
record for assessing the constitutionality of the death penalty is very 
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different from what existed when Cross was decided. ARB
2
 at 56-57 
(discussing the 120 additional trial reports filed since Cross’s, 67 of which 
were filed after Cross, and the resulting Beckett Report). This alone is 
sufficient to revisit Cross.  
In addition, Cross’s reliance upon Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 
96 S. Ct. 2909, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1976),
3
 should be reconsidered for three 
additional reasons. First, Cross relied heavily on the Washington death 
penalty statute’s similarity to the statute upheld in Gregg. Yet, as the 
Gregg Court recognized, the constitutionality of any death penalty statute 
must be judged first under Furman. 428 U.S. at 188-89 (citing Furman, 
408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring) and 408 U.S. at 309-10 (Stewart, 
J., concurring)). Accordingly, whether a particular death penalty statute 
passes muster should depend not on its resemblance to the statutes upheld 
in Gregg, but rather on an assessment—based on the available data—of 
whether the statute prevents arbitrary application of the death penalty. 
Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring). And, as Mr. Gregory 
                                                 
2
 We adopt Mr. Gregory’s naming conventions for citations to briefs: AOB for 
Mr. Gregory’s opening brief; BOR for the State’s brief; and ARB for Mr. Gregory’s 
reply. 
3
 Cross relies on a line of cases that traces back to Gregg. See Cross, 156 Wn.2d 
at 623 (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189); In re Cross, 180 Wn.2d 664, 731, 327 P.3d 660 
(2014) (quoting State v. Dodd, 120 Wn.2d 1, 13 n. 2, 838 P.2d 86 (1992) (citing Gregg, 
428 U.S. at 188-89)). 
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asserts, “The data are now available, and they demonstrate that the 
required narrowing has not been achieved.” ARB at 64.  
Second, Gregg cannot be the last word on the constitutionality of 
Washington’s death penalty statute because that case was necessarily 
speculative. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198 (because Troy Leon Gregg was 
the first individual convicted and sentenced under Georgia’s new 
procedures, the Court could only surmise that “[o]n their face these 
procedures seem to satisfy the concerns of Furman.”) (emphasis added)).4 
As Justice Breyer recently explained in his dissent in Glossip v. Gross, 
“[i]n 1976 [when the Court decided Gregg], the Court thought that the 
constitutional infirmities in the death penalty could be healed.…Almost 40 
years of studies, surveys, and experience strongly indicate, however, that 
this effort has failed.” 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755, 192 L. Ed. 2d 
761 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2759-60 (“When the 
death penalty was reinstated in 1976, this Court acknowledged that the 
death penalty is (and would be) unconstitutional if ‘inflicted in an arbitrary 
and capricious manner.’”) (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188 (joint opinion of 
                                                 
4
 See also Steven F. Shatz & Terry Dalton, Challenging the Death Penalty with 
Statistics: Furman, McCleskey, and a Single County Case Study, 34 Cardozo L. Rev. 
1227, 1235 (2013) (explaining the Court upheld the statutory schemes at issue in Gregg 
“on the basis of its assumptions about how the schemes would operate because there was 
not yet any empirical evidence to challenge those assumptions.”). 
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Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 
427-29, 100 S. Ct. 1759, 64 L. Ed. 2d 398 (1980) (plurality opinion) 
(vacating a death sentence that had been imposed based on a statutory 
aggravating circumstance which, standing alone without further definition, 
allowed for standardless sentencing discretion) (citing Furman, 408 U.S. 
at 313 (White, J., concurring) and Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188-89) (opinion of 
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)). 
  Finally, the Court in Gregg did not have the benefit of the 
developed body of social science research on implicit bias that is now 
available for this Court to consider. Unaided by this more nuanced 
understanding of juror decision making, Gregg considered discretionary 
leniency only as isolated acts of mercy, rather than understanding 
discretionary leniency as a mechanism of system-wide arbitrariness. See 
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199, 203, 206-07.
5
  
Because this Court has new data demonstrating the arbitrary 
application of Washington’s death penalty, and because recent social 
science literature compels a new understanding of discretionary leniency, 
                                                 
5
 Relying on Gregg, the Court in McCleskey v. Kemp recognized that a capital 
punishment system is unconstitutional if it “operates in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner,” but concluded that discretionary leniency did not contribute to arbitrary 
outcomes in that case. 481 U.S. 279, 306-08, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 95 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1987) 
(citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199). 
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stare decisis does not require adherence to Cross and this Court must 
consider anew the constitutionality of Washington’s death penalty statute.  
II. ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 AND RCW 10.95.130(2)(B) 
DEMAND INVESTIGATION INTO ALL MECHANISMS 
OF ARBITRARINESS, BECAUSE ARBITRARINESS IS 
CRUEL. 
 
a. In Assessing Arbitrariness, Washington Law Demands 
Consideration of Cases in Which Capital Juries Exercised 
Mercy. 
 
The question of mercy, or discretionary leniency, is highly relevant 
under Washington jurisprudence. See Const. art. I, § 14; State v. Fain, 94 
Wn.2d 387, 392-93, 397, 617 P.2d 720 (1980). Article I, Section 14 of the 
Washington Constitution states: “Excessive bail shall not be required, 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel punishment inflicted.” Const. art. I, § 
14. Washington’s prohibition against cruel punishment is more protective 
than the Eighth Amendment.
6
 See, e.g., State v. Witherspoon, 180 Wn.2d 
875, 887, 329 P.3d 888 (2014); State v. Rivers, 129 Wn.2d 697, 712, 921 
P.2d 495 (1996); Fain, 94 Wn.2d at 392-93. Although Mr. Gregory is 
                                                 
6
 In the limited context of whether a capital defendant can waive review, this 
Court determined that Article I, section 14 does not provide more protection than the 
Eighth Amendment. Dodd, 120 Wn.2d at 20-22 (holding that a capital defendant may 
waive general review, but may not waive mandatory review required by Chapter 10.95 
RCW); see also State v. Yates, 161 Wn.2d 714, 792, 168 P.3d 359 (2007) (citing Dodd, 
120 Wn.2d at 22) (relying on Dodd’s statement that Gunwall factors do not demand that 
Article I, section 14 be interpreted more broadly than the Eighth Amendment in 
dismissing Yates’ much broader argument that Chapter 10.95 RCW is arbitrary and thus 
violates Article I, section 14, when Dodd examined only whether Article I, section 14 
provided greater protection regarding waiver of appeal).  
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entitled to relief under both the Eighth Amendment and under 
Washington’s constitutional prohibition of cruel punishment, this Court 
may grant relief based on the more protective Article I, section 14 even if 
it does not decide that Furman and its progeny require invalidation of the 
capital punishment scheme. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041-42, 
103 S. Ct. 3469, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201 (1983); see also ARB at 69.  
One of the hallmarks of a just punishment is its proportionality to 
the crime; conversely, punishment that is disproportionate is, under Article 
I, Section 14, cruel. See generally Fain, 94 Wn.2d at 396-401. But the 
proportionality inquiry is not limited to whether a particular punishment is 
proportionate to the crime; proportionality is a broad and evolving concept 
that must be able to examine proportionality as a systemic issue. As the 
Court in Fain explained, proportionality “is an illusive concept which has 
developed gradually in response to society’s changes…its scope is not 
static; rather, it ‘must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’” 94 Wn.2d at 396-
97 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101, 78 S. Ct. 590, 2 L. Ed. 2d 
630 (1958)). Therefore, the proportionality of one death sentence must be 
judged not only in relationship to other death sentences, but also in 
relationship to life sentences for aggravated murder as well—i.e., cases 
where jurors have exercised discretionary leniency. 
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Further, the plain language of the proportionality review statute, 
which requires the Court to determine “[w]hether the sentence of death is 
excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, 
considering both the crime and the defendant,” requires inclusion of all 
similar aggravated murder convictions. RCW 10.95.130(2)(b). “Similar 
cases” is defined as “cases…in which the judge or jury considered the 
imposition of capital punishment regardless of whether it was imposed or 
executed, and cases in which reports have been filed with the supreme 
court under RCW 10.95.120.” RCW 10.95.130(2)(b) (emphasis added). 
RCW 10.95.120 requires trial judges to submit reports in all aggravated 
murder convictions. RCW 10.95.120; State v. Davis, 175 Wn.2d 287, 
¶118, 290 P.3d 43 (2012). As this Court in Davis explained: “[T]he statute 
instructs us to compare Davis’s death sentence to the penalty imposed in 
all cases of aggravated first degree murder, regardless of whether the 
prosecutor pursued the death penalty or whether the fact finder returned a 
sentence of death or life imprisonment.” 175 Wn.2d ¶118; see also State v. 
Davis, 141 Wn.2d 798, 880, 10 P.3d 977 (2000).   
 
 
 
10 
 
b. Washington’s Constitutional and Statutory Mandate to 
Assess the Proportionality of a Death Sentence Allows for 
the Consideration of Statistical Evidence, and that Evidence 
Suggests the Death Penalty Is Disproportionately Imposed 
on the Impermissible Basis of Race. 
 
Statistical evidence of racial disproportionality is an appropriate 
metric for both the constitutional and statutory measure of arbitrariness in 
Washington State and can therefore form the basis for relief under either 
Article I, section 14, or under statutory proportionality review pursuant to 
RCW 10.95.130(2)(b). See Davis, 175 Wn.2d ¶156.
7
 And, because 
Washington law requires consideration of all aggravated murder 
convictions, any statistical or other analysis of system-wide arbitrariness 
must take into account those cases where the jury (or prosecutor) 
exercised mercy. 
The Beckett Report—the most comprehensive statistical analysis 
of racial disproportionality in Washington’s death penalty—concludes that 
a capital defendant’s race is likely the most influential factor in 
determining whether he is sentenced to death or to life without parole. See 
generally Katherine Beckett & Heather Evans, The Role of Race in 
                                                 
7
 Unlike in Davis, Mr. Gregory has asserted that this evidence of racial 
disproportionality renders his sentence random and arbitrary, in violation of both RCW 
10.95.130 (AOB at 97-99, ARB at 46-48) and Article I, section 14 (AOB at 104-15, ARB 
at 69-73). 
11 
 
Washington State Capital Sentencing, 1981-2014, 31-33 (2014).
8
 
Professor Beckett explains that “the case characteristics for which data are 
available and which are presumed to be the primary drivers of decision-
making in capital cases actually explain a small proportion of the variance 
in case outcomes in aggravated murder cases.” Id. at 32. Instead, extra-
legal factors—most notably, the race of the defendant—have a striking 
impact on sentencing decisions. Id. at 32-33; see also id. at 10-12 
(summarizing research demonstrating implicit bias generally and more 
specifically against Black criminal defendants in capital trials). 
Specifically, Professor Beckett found that after controlling for all other 
variables in her model, a Black defendant is “four and one half times more 
likely than similarly situated non-black defendants to be sentenced to 
death.” Id. at 30. The Beckett Report therefore provides the basis for a 
searching inquiry into the possible mechanisms of racial 
disproportionality.  
 
 
                                                 
8
 Importantly, the Beckett Report is based on data since implementation of the 
death penalty in 1981. Specifically, she included all trial court reports involving death 
eligible defendants convicted of aggravated murder between December 1981 and May 
2014, which totaled 297. Id. at 4-5. Thirty cases involved juvenile defendants, and three 
involved defendants who were ineligible due to extradition agreements. Id. at 4.  
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III. THE MECHANISM OF IN-GROUP FAVORITISM, IN 
ADDITION TO AVERSIVE BIAS, HELPS ACCOUNT FOR 
THE ARBITRARY AND RACIALLY 
DISPROPORTIONATE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH 
PENALTY. 
 
The Beckett Report suggests that in exercising “the discretion so 
regularly conferred upon them,”9 juries are no more capable of making 
unbiased decisions in capital trials than in other contexts.
10
 And while 
racial disproportionality can be attributed in part to aversive racism, or 
racial derogation, “preferential treatment of white Americans helps drive 
the stark disparities that define America’s criminal justice system.” Robert 
J. Smith et al., Implicit White Favoritism in the Criminal Justice System, 
66 Ala. L. Rev. 871, 873 (2015) [hereinafter Smith, Implicit White 
Favoritism]. “To gain a fuller understanding of what drives unjustified 
disparities….[we must examine] the bias of implicit favoritism.”11 Id. at 
874 (explaining that even if aversive bias disappeared, “racial disparities 
                                                 
9
 Furman, 408 U.S. at 314 (White, J., concurring). 
10
 Consistent with Washington’s more robust constitutional protections, 
Washington antidiscrimination jurisprudence is evolving to provide remedies for a 
constitutionally cognizable risk of racial bias, even absent evidence of actual prejudice. 
See, e.g., State v. Saintcalle, 178 Wn.2d 34, ¶2, 309 P.3d 326 (2013) (concluding that 
Washington’s Batson procedures are not robust enough to effectively combat implicit 
racial bias); State v. Monday, 171 Wn.2d 667, 257 P.3d 551 (2011) (reversing murder 
conviction because the prosecutor improperly injected racial prejudice into the trial, and 
recognizing the constitutionally cognizable risk that Mr. Monday’s right to a fair trial 
under Article I, section 22, was violated). 
11
 In-group favoritism is distinct from aversive racism, whose focal points are 
the negative beliefs about another group. Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, 
Understanding and Addressing Contemporary Racism: From Aversive Racism to the 
Common In-group Identity Model, 61 J. Soc. Issues 615, 618 (2005). 
13 
 
would persist because removing derogation is not the same as being race-
neutral.”)  
Consistent with research suggesting that preferential treatment of 
white defendants is partially responsible for driving racial disparities in the 
criminal justice system, Amicus encourages this Court to consider how in-
group favoritism may account for some of the racial disproportionality that 
plagues Washington’s death penalty scheme. The mechanisms of in-group 
favoritism are complex, but their effect is simple: social science teaches us 
that an individual who identifies with a group makes decisions and 
judgments to favor that in-group. Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup 
Favoritism, Outgroup Favoritism, and Their Behavioral Manifestations, 
17 Soc. Just. Res. 143, 146 (2004). 
Indeed, it is well documented that people implicitly and 
automatically “favor their own group at the expense of other groups in 
terms of their evaluations, judgments, and behavior in intergroup 
relations.” Dasgupta, supra, at 146 (listing studies); Smith, Implicit White 
Favoritism, supra, at 874-75 (discussing implicit favoritism, defined as 
“the automatic association of positive stereotypes and attitudes with 
members of a favored group, leading to preferential treatment for persons 
of that group” (citing Dasgupta, supra, at 146-47)). Therefore, racial 
discrimination, and consequently racial disproportionality, is likely to be 
14 
 
“as much an exercise of in-group favoritism as it is an exercise of out-
group derision.” Catherine Smith, The Group Dangers of Race-Based 
Conspiracies, 59 Rutgers L. Rev. 55, 58, 68-72 (2006).  
For example, psychological research demonstrates that people 
experience more empathy for in-group than out-group members. Smith, 
Implicit White Favoritism, supra, at 899. In a criminal trial, jurors are 
tasked with understanding the intentions, actions, and behaviors of 
defendants; thus, if a juror’s “empathic abilit[y] [is] fraught with implicit 
favoritism for in-group members, one might expect that disparities could 
result.” Id.; see also Mina Cikara et al., Us and Them: Intergroup Failures 
of Empathy, 20 Current Directions Psychol. Sci. 149, 150 (2011) (studies 
have demonstrated that, as a result of implicit favoritism toward one’s own 
“group,” people are more likely to empathize with their in-group than 
those in the out-group). 
In one mock juror study, researchers found that the “weight given 
the mitigating evidence by our jurors significantly differed as a function of 
the racial dimension of the case,” and tied their findings to the ability of 
jurors to empathize with the defendant. Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, 
Capital Jury Deliberation: Effects on Death Sentencing, Comprehension, 
and Discrimination, 33 Law & Hum. Behav. 481, 494 (2009). Jurors 
tended to give less weight to mitigation evidence for Black defendants 
15 
 
(consistent with the implicit aversive bias explanation), id., with white 
male jurors having the highest tendency to misuse mitigating evidence, id. 
at 488-89 (Table 3), 494. The researchers explained their understanding of 
their findings in terms of both aversive bias and in-group dynamics: 
  We view the racial differences in the use and misuse of 
mitigating evidence…as stemming largely from our participants’ 
inability or unwillingness to empathize with the plight of Black 
defendants…. 
This suggests that juries composed largely of White 
members may legitimize and widen the empathic divide in the 
course of their deliberations over punishment. Thus, the presence 
of other more similar-appearing jurors may underscore the 
defendant’s lack of similarity, activating racial solidarity rather 
than cross-racial compassion. 
 
Id. at 494 (emphasis in original). The same researchers later explained this 
phenomenon as the “tendency for White jurors—especially White male 
jurors—to interpret many common penalty phase facts and circumstances 
as potentially mitigating for a White defendant but to see those same 
things as irrelevant or even aggravating for a defendant who is Black.” 
Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Looking Across the Empathic Divide: 
Racialized Decision Making on the Capital Jury, 2011 Mich. St. L. Rev. 
573, 574 (2011). 
Jurors’ inability to cross what Lynch and Haney call the “empathic 
divide” “further institutionalizes what social psychologists have termed 
the ‘fundamental attribution error’—systematically discounting the 
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important social, historical, and situational determinants of behavior (in 
this case, criminal behavior) and correspondingly exaggerating the causal 
role of dispositional or individual characteristics.” Id. at 590. Attribution 
error
12
 explains how our prejudices shape our understanding of others’ 
behavior. Smith, Implicit White Favoritism, supra, at 902. Social scientists 
have found that people tend to attribute positive behaviors of in-group 
members as dispositional and negative behavior as situational. Id. at 903. 
Attribution error therefore bears directly upon how jurors’ understanding 
of mitigation evidence is influenced by race, contributing to racially 
disproportionate punishment.
13
  
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 The terms altered attribution and Ultimate Attribution Error are also used in 
social science literature to refer to the same phenomenon. 
13
 In the juvenile offender context where there is severe racial disproportionality, 
attribution error would “suggest that white jurors are more likely to deem [a] white 
juvenile’s actions as ‘unfortunate’ and attributable to the ‘transient’ nature of youth; 
whereas the same white jurors could find that a…black male [juvenile] defendant who 
committed the same violent crime did so because it reflects his ‘irreparably corrupt’ 
disposition.” Smith, Implicit White Favoritism, supra, at 912. In Washington State, this is 
precisely what has been observed. See Task Force on Race and the Criminal Justice 
System, Preliminary Report on Race and Washington’s Criminal Justice System, 35 
Seattle U. L. Rev. 623, 647 (2012), 47 Gonz. L. Rev. 251 (2012), 87 Wash. L. Rev. 1 
(2012) (discussing study of probation officers in Washington state which showed that 
“[b]lack youths’ crimes are commonly attributed to internal traits (attitudes and 
personalities) while white youths’ crimes are attributed to their social environment (peers 
and family),” which contributes to “more severe sanctions and sentencing 
recommendations for black youth” (citation omitted)). 
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IV. PASSION OR PREJUDICE REVIEW UNDER RCW 
10.95.130(2)(C) CREATES A STATUTORY REMEDY FOR 
DEATH SENTENCES INFECTED BY IMPLICIT BIAS.  
 
RCW 10.95.130(2)(c) mandates that this Court review every death 
sentence to ensure it was not “brought about through passion or 
prejudice.” As this Court recognized in State v. Saintcalle, racism lives 
“beneath the surface—in our institutions and our subconscious thought 
processes—because we suppress it and because we create it anew through 
cognitive processes that have nothing to with racial animus.” 178 Wn.2d 
34, ¶24, 309 P.3d 326 (2013). Implicit bias literature teaches us that bias 
still operates even absent explicit appeals to the passion or prejudice of the 
jury.  
Death sentences may be influenced not only by in-group 
favoritism, as discussed above, but also by implicit aversive bias. Some of 
the most telling evidence of implicit aversive bias emerges from 
experiments with the perception of black faces. See Jennifer L. Eberhardt 
et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime and Visual Processing, 87 J. Personality 
& Soc. Psychol. 876, 876 (2004). Studies show a strong tendency to link 
the social category of black with concepts of crime. Id. (citing studies). 
Eberhardt designed studies to further examine the bidirectional nature of 
the link—i.e., “the association of Blacks with crime renders objects 
relevant in the context of Black faces and Black faces relevant in the 
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context of crime.” Id. at 877. Eberhardt’s first study demonstrated that 
when subjects were primed with 30-microsecond images of black faces, 
and then shown a degraded and fuzzy image of a gun, id. at 878-81, the 
“Black faces triggered a form of racialized seeing that facilitated the 
processing of crime-relevant objects,” id. at 881. Conversely, “exposure to 
White faces inhibited the detection of crime-relevant object.” Id. 
Eberhardt’s second study confirmed the hypothesis of the bidirectional 
link between race and crime, revealing that “race-neutral concepts such as 
crime can become racialized. Not only are Blacks thought of as criminal, 
but also crime is thought of as Black.” Id. at 883. 
Further, the more stereotypically “black” a person appears 
physically (e.g., broad nose, thick lips, dark skin), the more criminal that 
person is judged to be. See Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Looking 
Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts 
Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 Psychol. Sci. 383, 383-85 (2006). In 
fact, Eberhardt and her colleagues found that perceived stereotypicality of 
black defendants predicts whether they receive a death sentence in cases 
where race is highly salient—a black defendant charged with killing a 
white victim. Id. at 383. In such cases, black defendants who fell in the top 
half as opposed to the bottom half of the stereotypicality distribution had 
double the chance of receiving a death sentence. Id. at 385. Studies also 
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link the increased likelihood of capital punishment where the victim is 
white to an implicit bias that associates white lives with concepts of value 
and black lives with concepts of worthlessness. See Justin D. Levinson et 
al., Devaluing Death: An Empirical Study of Implicit Racial Bias on Jury-
Eligible Citizens in Six Death Penalty States, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 513, 521, 
564 (2014).  
This implicit bias research demonstrates that discrimination does 
not need to be “injected by the prosecution”14 in order to exist and to 
automatically and unconsciously corrupt the process of considering the 
death penalty. Implicit bias deeply disrupts traditional assumptions about 
the jury decision-making process, and the very concept of requiring 
purposeful discrimination. Because people may lack full cognitive access 
to what motivates their behavior, this Court must move beyond requiring 
conscious intentionality before attributing bias as a motivating factor of 
jurors.  
Equipped with the Beckett Report, as well as its own sophisticated 
understanding of implicit bias, this Court is well positioned to review 
death sentences for passion or prejudice in a manner that recognizes how 
bias actually operates. This Court should reverse Mr. Gregory’s death 
                                                 
14
 See Monday, 171 Wn.2d at 678. 
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sentence, in recognition of the great improbability that a capital jury can 
render a verdict free from implicit bias.  
CONCLUSION 
 
 Washington’s capital punishment scheme allows jurors broad 
discretion, and the exercise of that discretion results in the arbitrary and 
racially biased imposition of the death penalty. Aversive racism makes 
Black defendants less likely to receive discretionary leniency, while in-
group favoritism makes White defendants more likely to receive mercy. 
The scheme accordingly violates the Eighth Amendment under Furman, 
and also runs afoul of the heightened protection of our state constitution’s 
cruel punishment provision. Finally, Mr. Gregory’s sentence is invalid 
under RCW 10.95.130(2), which requires death sentences to be 
proportionate and free of passion or prejudice. For all these reasons, 
Amicus urges this Court to reverse.  
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